fix: multiple security bugs + remove example for now

This commit is contained in:
2026-05-07 18:21:34 -04:00
parent 95f5a83bd2
commit 6bef88fde6
18 changed files with 336 additions and 587 deletions
-1
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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
# Authentication
+60 -75
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@@ -47,12 +47,9 @@ async def me(user: User = Security(bearer)):
#### Token prefix
The optional `prefix` parameter restricts a `BearerTokenAuth` instance to tokens
that start with a given string. The prefix is **kept** in the value passed to the
validator — store and compare tokens with their prefix included.
The optional `prefix` parameter restricts a `BearerTokenAuth` instance to tokens that start with a given string. The prefix is **kept** in the value passed to the validator — store and compare tokens with their prefix included.
This lets you deploy multiple `BearerTokenAuth` instances in the same application
and disambiguate them efficiently in `MultiAuth`:
This lets you deploy multiple `BearerTokenAuth` instances in the same application and disambiguate them efficiently in `MultiAuth`:
```python
user_bearer = BearerTokenAuth(verify_user, prefix="user_") # matches "Bearer user_..."
@@ -63,9 +60,7 @@ Use [`generate_token()`](#token-generation) to create correctly-prefixed tokens.
#### Token generation
`BearerTokenAuth.generate_token()` produces a secure random token ready to store
in your database and return to the client. If a prefix is configured it is
prepended automatically:
`BearerTokenAuth.generate_token()` produces a secure random token ready to store in your database and return to the client. If a prefix is configured it is prepended automatically:
```python
bearer = BearerTokenAuth(verify_token, prefix="user_")
@@ -75,18 +70,23 @@ await db.store_token(user_id, token)
return {"access_token": token, "token_type": "bearer"}
```
The client sends `Authorization: Bearer user_Xk3mN...` and the validator receives
the full token (prefix included) to compare against the stored value.
The client sends `Authorization: Bearer user_Xk3mN...` and the validator receives the full token (prefix included) to compare against the stored value.
### [`CookieAuth`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.CookieAuth)
Reads a named cookie. Wraps `APIKeyCookie` for OpenAPI.
Cookies are issued with the `Secure` flag set by default, meaning they are only transmitted over HTTPS. Set `secure=False` when running locally over plain HTTP:
```python
from fastapi_toolsets.security import CookieAuth
# Production (HTTPS) — default
cookie_auth = CookieAuth("session", validator=verify_session)
# Local development (HTTP only)
cookie_auth = CookieAuth("session", validator=verify_session, secure=False)
@app.get("/me")
async def me(user: User = Security(cookie_auth)):
return user
@@ -94,16 +94,17 @@ async def me(user: User = Security(cookie_auth)):
#### Signed cookies
Pass `secret_key` to enable HMAC-SHA256 signed, tamper-proof cookies. The cookie
payload includes an expiry timestamp (`ttl`, default 24 h). No database entry is
required — the signature is self-contained.
Pass `secret_key` to enable HMAC-SHA256 signed, tamper-proof cookies. The cookie payload includes an expiry timestamp (`ttl`, default 24 h). No database entry is required — the signature is self-contained.
Use `set_cookie()` to issue the signed cookie on login and `delete_cookie()` to
clear it on logout:
Use `set_cookie()` to issue the signed cookie on login and `delete_cookie()` to clear it on logout:
```python
# Production
cookie_auth = CookieAuth("session", verify_session, secret_key="your-secret")
# Local development
cookie_auth = CookieAuth("session", verify_session, secret_key="your-secret", secure=False)
@app.post("/login")
async def login(response: Response):
cookie_auth.set_cookie(response, user_id)
@@ -119,8 +120,7 @@ async def me(user: User = Security(cookie_auth)):
return user
```
When `secret_key` is not set, the raw cookie value is passed directly to the
validator (stateful session behaviour — you manage the session store).
When `secret_key` is not set, the raw cookie value is passed directly to the validator (stateful session behaviour — you manage the session store).
### [`APIKeyHeaderAuth`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.APIKeyHeaderAuth)
@@ -136,14 +136,11 @@ async def data(user: User = Security(api_key_auth)):
return user
```
The header name is configurable — use any header your API defines (e.g.
`"X-API-Key"`, `"Authorization"`, `"X-Service-Token"`).
The header name is configurable — use any header your API defines (e.g. `"X-API-Key"`, `"Authorization"`, `"X-Service-Token"`).
## Typed validator kwargs
All auth classes forward extra instantiation keyword arguments to the validator.
Arguments can be any type — enums, strings, integers, etc. The validator returns
the authenticated identity, which FastAPI injects directly into the route handler.
All auth classes forward extra instantiation keyword arguments to the validator. Arguments can be any type — enums, strings, integers, etc. The validator returns the authenticated identity, which FastAPI injects directly into the route handler.
```python
async def verify_token(token: str, *, role: Role, permission: str) -> User:
@@ -155,14 +152,11 @@ async def verify_token(token: str, *, role: Role, permission: str) -> User:
bearer = BearerTokenAuth(verify_token, role=Role.ADMIN, permission="billing:read")
```
Each auth instance is self-contained — create a separate instance per distinct
requirement instead of passing requirements through `Security(scopes=[...])`.
Each auth instance is self-contained — create a separate instance per distinct requirement instead of passing requirements through `Security(scopes=[...])`.
### Using `.require()` inline
If declaring a new top-level variable per role feels verbose, use `.require()` to
create a configured clone directly in the route decorator. The original instance
is not mutated:
If declaring a new top-level variable per role feels verbose, use `.require()` to create a configured clone directly in the route decorator. The original instance is not mutated:
```python
bearer = BearerTokenAuth(verify_token)
@@ -191,13 +185,9 @@ multi = MultiAuth(
## MultiAuth
[`MultiAuth`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.MultiAuth) combines
multiple auth sources into a single callable. Sources are tried in order; the
first one that finds a credential wins.
[`MultiAuth`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.MultiAuth) combines multiple auth sources into a single callable. Sources are tried in order; the first one that finds a credential wins.
If a credential is extracted but the validator raises, the exception propagates
immediately — the remaining sources are **not** tried. This prevents silent
fallthrough on invalid credentials.
If a credential is extracted but the validator raises, the exception propagates immediately — the remaining sources are **not** tried. This prevents silent fallthrough on invalid credentials.
```python
from fastapi_toolsets.security import MultiAuth
@@ -211,9 +201,7 @@ async def data_route(user = Security(multi)):
### Using `.require()` on MultiAuth
`MultiAuth` also supports `.require()`, which propagates the kwargs to every
source that implements it. Sources that do not (e.g. custom `AuthSource`
subclasses) are passed through unchanged:
`MultiAuth` also supports `.require()`, which propagates the kwargs to every source that implements it. Sources that do not (e.g. custom `AuthSource` subclasses) are passed through unchanged:
```python
multi = MultiAuth(bearer, cookie)
@@ -237,9 +225,7 @@ MultiAuth(
### Prefix-based dispatch
Because `extract()` is pure string matching (no I/O), prefix-based source
selection is essentially free. Only the matching source's validator (which may
involve DB or network I/O) is ever called:
Because `extract()` is pure string matching (no I/O), prefix-based source selection is essentially free. Only the matching source's validator (which may involve DB or network I/O) is ever called:
```python
user_bearer = BearerTokenAuth(verify_user, prefix="user_")
@@ -251,8 +237,7 @@ multi = MultiAuth(user_bearer, org_bearer)
# "Bearer org_acme" → only verify_org runs, receives "org_acme"
```
Tokens are stored and compared **with their prefix** — use `generate_token()` on
each source to issue correctly-prefixed tokens:
Tokens are stored and compared **with their prefix** — use `generate_token()` on each source to issue correctly-prefixed tokens:
```python
user_token = user_bearer.generate_token() # "user_..."
@@ -261,9 +246,7 @@ org_token = org_bearer.generate_token() # "org_..."
## Custom auth sources
Subclass [`AuthSource`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.AuthSource)
to implement any credential extraction strategy. You only need to implement
`extract()` and `authenticate()`:
Subclass [`AuthSource`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.AuthSource) to implement any credential extraction strategy. You only need to implement `extract()` and `authenticate()`:
```python
from fastapi_toolsets.security import AuthSource
@@ -284,16 +267,11 @@ Custom sources work transparently inside `MultiAuth`.
## OAuth 2.0 / OIDC helpers
The module provides standalone async utilities for building OAuth 2.0 / OIDC
login flows. They handle provider discovery, authorization redirects, token
exchange, and state encoding — leaving JWT validation and session management to
your application.
The module provides standalone async utilities for building OAuth 2.0 / OIDC login flows. They handle provider discovery, authorization redirects, token exchange, and state encoding — leaving JWT validation and session management to your application.
### Provider discovery
[`oauth_resolve_provider_urls()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_resolve_provider_urls)
fetches the OIDC discovery document and returns the endpoint URLs. Results are
cached in-process to avoid repeated network calls:
[`oauth_resolve_provider_urls()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_resolve_provider_urls) fetches the OIDC discovery document and returns the endpoint URLs. Results are cached in-process to avoid repeated network calls:
```python
from fastapi_toolsets.security import oauth_resolve_provider_urls
@@ -303,42 +281,51 @@ auth_url, token_url, userinfo_url = await oauth_resolve_provider_urls(
)
```
Returns a `(authorization_url, token_url, userinfo_url)` tuple. `userinfo_url`
is `None` when the provider does not advertise one.
Returns a `(authorization_url, token_url, userinfo_url)` tuple. `userinfo_url` is `None` when the provider does not advertise one.
### Authorization redirect
[`oauth_build_authorization_redirect()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_build_authorization_redirect)
constructs the redirect to the provider's authorization page. The `destination`
URL (where to send the user after the full flow) is encoded as the `state`
parameter:
[`oauth_build_authorization_redirect()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_build_authorization_redirect) constructs the redirect to the provider's authorization page. It requires a `nonce` — a random CSRF token generated by [`oauth_generate_nonce()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_generate_nonce) — that must be stored server-side (e.g. in the session) and verified on the callback to prevent login-CSRF attacks (RFC 6749 §10.12):
```python
from fastapi_toolsets.security import oauth_build_authorization_redirect
from fastapi import Request
from fastapi_toolsets.security import oauth_build_authorization_redirect, oauth_generate_nonce
@app.get("/auth/google/login")
async def google_login():
async def google_login(request: Request):
auth_url, _, _ = await oauth_resolve_provider_urls(GOOGLE_DISCOVERY_URL)
nonce = oauth_generate_nonce()
request.session["oauth_nonce"] = nonce # requires SessionMiddleware
return oauth_build_authorization_redirect(
auth_url,
client_id=GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID,
scopes="openid email profile",
redirect_uri="https://myapp.com/auth/google/callback",
destination="/dashboard",
nonce=nonce,
)
```
### Token exchange and userinfo
[`oauth_fetch_userinfo()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_fetch_userinfo)
performs the two-step exchange: it POSTs the authorization code to the token
endpoint, then GETs the userinfo endpoint with the resulting access token:
[`oauth_fetch_userinfo()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_fetch_userinfo) performs the two-step exchange: it POSTs the authorization code to the token endpoint, then GETs the userinfo endpoint with the resulting access token.
On the callback, retrieve the stored nonce and pass it to [`oauth_decode_state()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_decode_state) to verify the CSRF token before processing the code:
```python
from fastapi_toolsets.security import oauth_fetch_userinfo
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request
from fastapi_toolsets.security import oauth_decode_state, oauth_fetch_userinfo
@app.get("/auth/google/callback")
async def google_callback(code: str, state: str):
async def google_callback(request: Request, code: str, state: str):
# Pop nonce first — single-use, regardless of whether verification succeeds
nonce = request.session.pop("oauth_nonce", None)
if nonce is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="missing OAuth state")
destination = oauth_decode_state(state, expected_nonce=nonce, fallback="/")
if not destination.startswith("/"): # reject absolute URLs to prevent open-redirect
destination = "/"
_, token_url, userinfo_url = await oauth_resolve_provider_urls(GOOGLE_DISCOVERY_URL)
userinfo = await oauth_fetch_userinfo(
token_url=token_url,
@@ -347,30 +334,28 @@ async def google_callback(code: str, state: str):
client_id=GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID,
client_secret=GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET,
redirect_uri="https://myapp.com/auth/google/callback",
required_scopes="openid email profile",
)
user = await db.upsert_user(email=userinfo["email"])
destination = oauth_decode_state(state, fallback="/")
response = RedirectResponse(destination)
session_cookie.set_cookie(response, str(user.id))
return response
```
Pass `required_scopes` to guard against providers silently granting fewer scopes than requested — `oauth_fetch_userinfo` raises `ValueError` if any are missing.
### State encoding
[`oauth_encode_state()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_encode_state)
and
[`oauth_decode_state()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_decode_state)
base64url-encode and decode the destination URL embedded in the OAuth `state`
parameter. `oauth_decode_state` handles missing padding and returns the `fallback`
if `state` is absent, `"null"`, or malformed:
[`oauth_encode_state()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_encode_state) and [`oauth_decode_state()`](../reference/security.md#fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_decode_state) encode and decode the destination URL together with the CSRF nonce embedded in the OAuth `state` parameter. `oauth_decode_state` returns `fallback` if `state` is absent, malformed, or the nonce does not match:
```python
from fastapi_toolsets.security import oauth_encode_state, oauth_decode_state
encoded = oauth_encode_state("/dashboard") # e.g. "L2Rhc2hib2FyZA=="
decoded = oauth_decode_state(encoded, fallback="/") # "/dashboard"
decoded = oauth_decode_state(None, fallback="/") # "/"
decoded = oauth_decode_state("null", fallback="/") # "/"
nonce = "my-random-nonce"
encoded = oauth_encode_state("/dashboard", nonce)
decoded = oauth_decode_state(encoded, expected_nonce=nonce, fallback="/") # "/dashboard"
decoded = oauth_decode_state(encoded, expected_nonce="wrong", fallback="/") # "/"
decoded = oauth_decode_state(None, expected_nonce=nonce, fallback="/") # "/"
```
---
+3
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@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ from fastapi_toolsets.security import (
oauth_decode_state,
oauth_encode_state,
oauth_fetch_userinfo,
oauth_generate_nonce,
oauth_resolve_provider_urls,
)
```
@@ -33,6 +34,8 @@ from fastapi_toolsets.security import (
## ::: fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_fetch_userinfo
## ::: fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_generate_nonce
## ::: fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_build_authorization_redirect
## ::: fastapi_toolsets.security.oauth_encode_state
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
from fastapi import FastAPI
from fastapi_toolsets.exceptions import init_exceptions_handlers
from .routes import router
app = FastAPI()
init_exceptions_handlers(app=app)
app.include_router(router=router)
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
from fastapi_toolsets.crud import CrudFactory
from .models import OAuthAccount, OAuthProvider, Team, User, UserToken
TeamCrud = CrudFactory(model=Team)
UserCrud = CrudFactory(model=User)
UserTokenCrud = CrudFactory(model=UserToken)
OAuthProviderCrud = CrudFactory(model=OAuthProvider)
OAuthAccountCrud = CrudFactory(model=OAuthAccount)
-15
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@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
from fastapi import Depends
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import async_sessionmaker, create_async_engine
from fastapi_toolsets.db import create_db_context, create_db_dependency
DATABASE_URL = "postgresql+asyncpg://postgres:postgres@localhost:5432/postgres"
engine = create_async_engine(url=DATABASE_URL, future=True)
async_session_maker = async_sessionmaker(bind=engine, expire_on_commit=False)
get_db = create_db_dependency(session_maker=async_session_maker)
get_db_context = create_db_context(session_maker=async_session_maker)
SessionDep = Depends(get_db)
-105
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@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
import enum
from datetime import datetime
from uuid import UUID
from sqlalchemy import (
Boolean,
DateTime,
Enum,
ForeignKey,
Integer,
String,
UniqueConstraint,
)
from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PG_UUID
from sqlalchemy.orm import DeclarativeBase, Mapped, mapped_column, relationship
from fastapi_toolsets.models import TimestampMixin, UUIDMixin
class Base(DeclarativeBase, UUIDMixin):
type_annotation_map = {
str: String(),
int: Integer(),
UUID: PG_UUID(as_uuid=True),
datetime: DateTime(timezone=True),
}
class UserRole(enum.Enum):
admin = "admin"
moderator = "moderator"
user = "user"
class Team(Base, TimestampMixin):
__tablename__ = "teams"
name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, unique=True, index=True)
users: Mapped[list["User"]] = relationship(back_populates="team")
class User(Base, TimestampMixin):
__tablename__ = "users"
username: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, unique=True, index=True)
email: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(
String, unique=True, index=True, nullable=True
)
hashed_password: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String, nullable=True)
is_active: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=True)
role: Mapped[UserRole] = mapped_column(Enum(UserRole), default=UserRole.user)
team_id: Mapped[UUID | None] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("teams.id"), nullable=True)
team: Mapped["Team | None"] = relationship(back_populates="users")
oauth_accounts: Mapped[list["OAuthAccount"]] = relationship(back_populates="user")
tokens: Mapped[list["UserToken"]] = relationship(back_populates="user")
class UserToken(Base, TimestampMixin):
"""API tokens for a user (multiple allowed)."""
__tablename__ = "user_tokens"
user_id: Mapped[UUID] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("users.id"))
# Store hashed token value
token_hash: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, unique=True, index=True)
name: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String, nullable=True)
expires_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(
DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True
)
user: Mapped["User"] = relationship(back_populates="tokens")
class OAuthProvider(Base, TimestampMixin):
"""Configurable OAuth2 / OpenID Connect provider."""
__tablename__ = "oauth_providers"
slug: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, unique=True, index=True)
name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String)
client_id: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String)
client_secret: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String)
discovery_url: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, nullable=False)
scopes: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String, default="openid email profile")
is_active: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=True)
accounts: Mapped[list["OAuthAccount"]] = relationship(back_populates="provider")
class OAuthAccount(Base, TimestampMixin):
"""OAuth2 / OpenID Connect account linked to a user."""
__tablename__ = "oauth_accounts"
__table_args__ = (
UniqueConstraint("provider_id", "subject", name="uq_oauth_provider_subject"),
)
user_id: Mapped[UUID] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("users.id"))
provider_id: Mapped[UUID] = mapped_column(ForeignKey("oauth_providers.id"))
# OAuth `sub` / OpenID subject identifier
subject: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String)
user: Mapped["User"] = relationship(back_populates="oauth_accounts")
provider: Mapped["OAuthProvider"] = relationship(back_populates="accounts")
-122
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@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
from typing import Annotated
from uuid import UUID
import bcrypt
from fastapi import APIRouter, Form, HTTPException, Response, Security
from fastapi_toolsets.dependencies import PathDependency
from .crud import UserCrud, UserTokenCrud
from .db import SessionDep
from .models import OAuthProvider, User, UserToken
from .schemas import (
ApiTokenCreateRequest,
ApiTokenResponse,
RegisterRequest,
UserCreate,
UserResponse,
)
from .security import auth, cookie_auth, create_api_token
ProviderDep = PathDependency(
model=OAuthProvider,
field=OAuthProvider.slug,
session_dep=SessionDep,
param_name="slug",
)
def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
return bcrypt.hashpw(password.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt()).decode()
def verify_password(plain: str, hashed: str) -> bool:
return bcrypt.checkpw(plain.encode(), hashed.encode())
router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth")
@router.post("/register", response_model=UserResponse, status_code=201)
async def register(body: RegisterRequest, session: SessionDep):
existing = await UserCrud.first(
session=session, filters=[User.username == body.username]
)
if existing:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Username already taken")
user = await UserCrud.create(
session=session,
obj=UserCreate(
username=body.username,
email=body.email,
hashed_password=hash_password(body.password),
),
)
return user
@router.post("/token", status_code=204)
async def login(
session: SessionDep,
response: Response,
username: Annotated[str, Form()],
password: Annotated[str, Form()],
):
user = await UserCrud.first(session=session, filters=[User.username == username])
if (
not user
or not user.hashed_password
or not verify_password(password, user.hashed_password)
):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Invalid credentials")
if not user.is_active:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Account disabled")
cookie_auth.set_cookie(response, str(user.id))
@router.post("/logout", status_code=204)
async def logout(response: Response):
cookie_auth.delete_cookie(response)
@router.get("/me", response_model=UserResponse)
async def me(user: User = Security(auth)):
return user
@router.post("/tokens", response_model=ApiTokenResponse, status_code=201)
async def create_token(
body: ApiTokenCreateRequest,
user: User = Security(auth),
):
raw, token_row = await create_api_token(
user.id, name=body.name, expires_at=body.expires_at
)
return ApiTokenResponse(
id=token_row.id,
name=token_row.name,
expires_at=token_row.expires_at,
created_at=token_row.created_at,
token=raw,
)
@router.delete("/tokens/{token_id}", status_code=204)
async def revoke_token(
session: SessionDep,
token_id: UUID,
user: User = Security(auth),
):
if not await UserTokenCrud.first(
session=session,
filters=[UserToken.id == token_id, UserToken.user_id == user.id],
):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Token not found")
await UserTokenCrud.delete(
session=session,
filters=[UserToken.id == token_id, UserToken.user_id == user.id],
)
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
from datetime import datetime
from uuid import UUID
from pydantic import EmailStr
from fastapi_toolsets.schemas import PydanticBase
class RegisterRequest(PydanticBase):
username: str
password: str
email: EmailStr | None = None
class UserResponse(PydanticBase):
id: UUID
username: str
email: str | None
role: str
is_active: bool
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
class ApiTokenCreateRequest(PydanticBase):
name: str | None = None
expires_at: datetime | None = None
class ApiTokenResponse(PydanticBase):
id: UUID
name: str | None
expires_at: datetime | None
created_at: datetime
# Only populated on creation
token: str | None = None
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
class OAuthProviderResponse(PydanticBase):
slug: str
name: str
model_config = {"from_attributes": True}
class UserCreate(PydanticBase):
username: str
email: str | None = None
hashed_password: str | None = None
class UserTokenCreate(PydanticBase):
user_id: UUID
token_hash: str
name: str | None = None
expires_at: datetime | None = None
class OAuthAccountCreate(PydanticBase):
user_id: UUID
provider_id: UUID
subject: str
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
import hashlib
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from uuid import UUID
from fastapi import HTTPException
from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
from fastapi_toolsets.exceptions import UnauthorizedError
from fastapi_toolsets.security import (
APIKeyHeaderAuth,
BearerTokenAuth,
CookieAuth,
MultiAuth,
)
from .crud import UserCrud, UserTokenCrud
from .db import get_db_context
from .models import User, UserRole, UserToken
from .schemas import UserTokenCreate
SESSION_COOKIE = "session"
SECRET_KEY = "123456789"
def _hash_token(token: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()
async def _verify_token(token: str, role: UserRole | None = None) -> User:
async with get_db_context() as db:
user_token = await UserTokenCrud.first(
session=db,
filters=[UserToken.token_hash == _hash_token(token)],
load_options=[selectinload(UserToken.user)],
)
if user_token is None or not user_token.user.is_active:
raise UnauthorizedError()
if user_token.expires_at and user_token.expires_at < datetime.now(timezone.utc):
raise UnauthorizedError()
user = user_token.user
if role is not None and user.role != role:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Insufficient permissions")
return user
async def _verify_cookie(user_id: str, role: UserRole | None = None) -> User:
async with get_db_context() as db:
user = await UserCrud.first(
session=db,
filters=[User.id == UUID(user_id)],
)
if not user or not user.is_active:
raise UnauthorizedError()
if role is not None and user.role != role:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Insufficient permissions")
return user
bearer_auth = BearerTokenAuth(
validator=_verify_token,
prefix="ctf_",
)
header_auth = APIKeyHeaderAuth(
name="X-API-Key",
validator=_verify_token,
)
cookie_auth = CookieAuth(
name=SESSION_COOKIE,
validator=_verify_cookie,
secret_key=SECRET_KEY,
)
auth = MultiAuth(bearer_auth, header_auth, cookie_auth)
async def create_api_token(
user_id: UUID,
*,
name: str | None = None,
expires_at: datetime | None = None,
) -> tuple[str, UserToken]:
raw = bearer_auth.generate_token()
async with get_db_context() as db:
token_row = await UserTokenCrud.create(
session=db,
obj=UserTokenCreate(
user_id=user_id,
token_hash=_hash_token(raw),
name=name,
expires_at=expires_at,
),
)
return raw, token_row
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ from .oauth import (
oauth_decode_state,
oauth_encode_state,
oauth_fetch_userinfo,
oauth_generate_nonce,
oauth_resolve_provider_urls,
)
from .sources import APIKeyHeaderAuth, BearerTokenAuth, CookieAuth, MultiAuth
@@ -20,5 +21,6 @@ __all__ = [
"oauth_decode_state",
"oauth_encode_state",
"oauth_fetch_userinfo",
"oauth_generate_nonce",
"oauth_resolve_provider_urls",
]
+2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
"""Abstract base class for authentication sources."""
import functools
import inspect
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from typing import Any, Callable
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ def _ensure_async(fn: Callable[..., Any]) -> Callable[..., Any]:
if inspect.iscoroutinefunction(fn):
return fn
@functools.wraps(fn)
async def wrapper(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
return fn(*args, **kwargs)
+96 -26
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,20 @@
"""OAuth 2.0 / OIDC helper utilities."""
import base64
import binascii
import hmac
import json
import secrets
import time as _time
from typing import Any
from urllib.parse import urlencode
import httpx
from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse
_discovery_cache: dict[str, dict] = {}
_discovery_cache: dict[str, tuple[dict[str, Any], float]] = {}
_DISCOVERY_TTL_SECONDS = 3600 # 1 hour
_DISCOVERY_CACHE_MAX = 32
async def oauth_resolve_provider_urls(
@@ -22,12 +29,17 @@ async def oauth_resolve_provider_urls(
A ``(authorization_url, token_url, userinfo_url)`` tuple.
*userinfo_url* is ``None`` when the provider does not advertise one.
"""
if discovery_url not in _discovery_cache:
now = _time.time()
cached = _discovery_cache.get(discovery_url)
if cached is None or now - cached[1] > _DISCOVERY_TTL_SECONDS:
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
resp = await client.get(discovery_url)
resp.raise_for_status()
_discovery_cache[discovery_url] = resp.json()
cfg = _discovery_cache[discovery_url]
if len(_discovery_cache) >= _DISCOVERY_CACHE_MAX:
oldest = min(_discovery_cache, key=lambda k: _discovery_cache[k][1])
del _discovery_cache[oldest]
_discovery_cache[discovery_url] = (resp.json(), now)
cfg = _discovery_cache[discovery_url][0]
return (
cfg["authorization_endpoint"],
cfg["token_endpoint"],
@@ -43,14 +55,10 @@ async def oauth_fetch_userinfo(
client_id: str,
client_secret: str,
redirect_uri: str,
required_scopes: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Exchange an authorization code for tokens and return the userinfo payload.
Performs the two-step OAuth 2.0 / OIDC token exchange:
1. POSTs the authorization *code* to *token_url* to obtain an access token.
2. GETs *userinfo_url* using that access token as a Bearer credential.
Args:
token_url: Provider's token endpoint.
userinfo_url: Provider's userinfo endpoint.
@@ -58,9 +66,16 @@ async def oauth_fetch_userinfo(
client_id: OAuth application client ID.
client_secret: OAuth application client secret.
redirect_uri: Redirect URI that was used in the authorization request.
required_scopes: Space-separated scopes that must be present in the token
response ``scope`` field (RFC 6749 §3.3). Raises ``ValueError`` if
the provider granted fewer scopes than requested.
Returns:
The JSON payload returned by the userinfo endpoint as a plain ``dict``.
Raises:
ValueError: If the provider granted a different token type than ``bearer``
or did not grant all ``required_scopes``.
"""
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
token_resp = await client.post(
@@ -75,7 +90,20 @@ async def oauth_fetch_userinfo(
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
)
token_resp.raise_for_status()
access_token = token_resp.json()["access_token"]
token_data = token_resp.json()
if token_data.get("token_type", "bearer").lower() != "bearer":
raise ValueError(
f"unsupported token_type: {token_data.get('token_type')!r}"
)
if required_scopes is not None:
granted = set(token_data.get("scope", "").split())
missing = set(required_scopes.split()) - granted
if missing:
raise ValueError(f"provider did not grant required scopes: {missing}")
access_token = token_data["access_token"]
userinfo_resp = await client.get(
userinfo_url,
@@ -85,6 +113,16 @@ async def oauth_fetch_userinfo(
return userinfo_resp.json()
def oauth_generate_nonce() -> str:
"""Generate a cryptographically random nonce for use as an OAuth CSRF token.
Call this before :func:`oauth_build_authorization_redirect`, persist the
returned value in the user's session or a ``Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax``
cookie, then verify it with :func:`oauth_decode_state` on the callback.
"""
return secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
def oauth_build_authorization_redirect(
authorization_url: str,
*,
@@ -92,6 +130,7 @@ def oauth_build_authorization_redirect(
scopes: str,
redirect_uri: str,
destination: str,
nonce: str,
) -> RedirectResponse:
"""Return an OAuth 2.0 authorization ``RedirectResponse``.
@@ -101,7 +140,10 @@ def oauth_build_authorization_redirect(
scopes: Space-separated list of requested scopes.
redirect_uri: URI the provider should redirect back to after authorization.
destination: URL the user should be sent to after the full OAuth flow
completes (encoded as ``state``).
completes (embedded in ``state``).
nonce: CSRF token generated by :func:`oauth_generate_nonce`. Must be
stored server-side (session or signed cookie) and verified via
:func:`oauth_decode_state` on the callback endpoint.
Returns:
A :class:`~fastapi.responses.RedirectResponse` to the provider's
@@ -113,28 +155,56 @@ def oauth_build_authorization_redirect(
"response_type": "code",
"scope": scopes,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"state": oauth_encode_state(destination),
"state": oauth_encode_state(destination, nonce),
}
)
return RedirectResponse(f"{authorization_url}?{params}")
def oauth_encode_state(url: str) -> str:
"""Base64url-encode a URL to embed as an OAuth ``state`` parameter."""
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(url.encode()).decode()
def oauth_encode_state(url: str, nonce: str) -> str:
"""Encode a destination URL and CSRF nonce into an OAuth ``state`` parameter.
def oauth_decode_state(state: str | None, *, fallback: str) -> str:
"""Decode a base64url OAuth ``state`` parameter.
Handles missing padding (some providers strip ``=``).
Returns *fallback* if *state* is absent, the literal string ``"null"``,
or cannot be decoded.
Args:
url: Post-login destination URL.
nonce: CSRF token from :func:`oauth_generate_nonce`.
"""
if not state or state == "null":
payload = json.dumps({"n": nonce, "d": url}, separators=(",", ":"))
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(payload.encode()).decode()
def oauth_decode_state(state: str | None, *, expected_nonce: str, fallback: str) -> str:
"""Decode and CSRF-verify an OAuth ``state`` parameter.
Uses a constant-time comparison for the nonce to prevent timing attacks.
Args:
state: Raw ``state`` query parameter from the provider's callback.
expected_nonce: The nonce stored before the authorization redirect.
If the decoded nonce does not match, ``fallback`` is returned.
fallback: URL to return when ``state`` is absent, malformed, or fails
CSRF verification.
Returns:
The destination URL embedded in ``state``, or ``fallback``.
Important:
**Single-use**: delete the stored nonce from the session immediately
after calling this function — whether it matched or not — so that a
captured callback URL cannot be replayed.
**Open-redirect**: validate the returned URL against a known-good
origin or relative-path allowlist before issuing the final redirect.
Do not forward arbitrary URLs to ``RedirectResponse``.
"""
if not state or state == "null": # "null" guards against JS JSON.stringify(null)
return fallback
try:
padded = state + "=" * (4 - len(state) % 4)
return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded).decode()
except Exception:
padded = state + "=" * (-len(state) % 4)
payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded).decode("utf-8"))
if not isinstance(payload, dict) or not hmac.compare_digest(
payload.get("n", "").encode(), expected_nonce.encode()
):
return fallback
return str(payload["d"])
except (UnicodeDecodeError, ValueError, binascii.Error, KeyError):
return fallback
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import inspect
import secrets
from typing import Annotated, Any, Callable
from fastapi import Depends
from fastapi import Depends, Request
from fastapi.security import HTTPAuthorizationCredentials, HTTPBearer, SecurityScopes
from fastapi_toolsets.exceptions import UnauthorizedError
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ class BearerTokenAuth(AuthSource):
raise UnauthorizedError()
return await self._validator(token, **self._kwargs)
async def extract(self, request: Any) -> str | None:
async def extract(self, request: Request) -> str | None:
"""Extract the raw credential from the request without validating.
Returns ``None`` if no ``Authorization: Bearer`` header is present,
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ class CookieAuth(AuthSource):
cookie value is passed to the validator as-is.
ttl: Cookie lifetime in seconds (default 24 h). Only used when
``secret_key`` is set.
secure: Set the ``Secure`` flag on the cookie so it is only transmitted
over HTTPS (default ``True``). Set to ``False`` only in local
development environments where HTTPS is unavailable.
**kwargs: Extra keyword arguments forwarded to the validator on every
call (e.g. ``role=Role.ADMIN``).
"""
@@ -47,12 +50,14 @@ class CookieAuth(AuthSource):
*,
secret_key: str | None = None,
ttl: int = 86400,
secure: bool = True,
**kwargs: Any,
) -> None:
self._name = name
self._validator = _ensure_async(validator)
self._secret_key = secret_key
self._ttl = ttl
self._secure = secure
self._kwargs = kwargs
self._scheme = APIKeyCookie(name=name, auto_error=False)
@@ -120,6 +125,7 @@ class CookieAuth(AuthSource):
self._validator,
secret_key=self._secret_key,
ttl=self._ttl,
secure=self._secure,
**{**self._kwargs, **kwargs},
)
@@ -131,9 +137,12 @@ class CookieAuth(AuthSource):
cookie_value,
httponly=True,
samesite="lax",
secure=self._secure,
max_age=self._ttl,
)
def delete_cookie(self, response: Response) -> None:
"""Clear the session cookie (logout)."""
response.delete_cookie(self._name, httponly=True, samesite="lax")
response.delete_cookie(
self._name, httponly=True, samesite="lax", secure=self._secure
)
+1 -49
View File
@@ -14,42 +14,8 @@ from ..abc import AuthSource
class MultiAuth:
"""Combine multiple authentication sources into a single callable.
Sources are tried in order; the first one whose
:meth:`~AuthSource.extract` returns a non-``None`` credential wins.
Its :meth:`~AuthSource.authenticate` is called and the result returned.
If a credential is found but the validator raises, the exception propagates
immediately — the remaining sources are **not** tried. This prevents
silent fallthrough on invalid credentials.
If no source provides a credential,
:class:`~fastapi_toolsets.exceptions.UnauthorizedError` is raised.
The :meth:`~AuthSource.extract` method of each source performs only
string matching (no I/O), so prefix-based dispatch is essentially free.
Any :class:`~AuthSource` subclass — including user-defined ones — can be
passed as a source.
Args:
*sources: Auth source instances to try in order.
Example::
user_bearer = BearerTokenAuth(verify_user, prefix="user_")
org_bearer = BearerTokenAuth(verify_org, prefix="org_")
cookie = CookieAuth("session", verify_session)
multi = MultiAuth(user_bearer, org_bearer, cookie)
@app.get("/data")
async def data_route(user = Security(multi)):
return user
# Apply a shared requirement to all sources at once
@app.get("/admin")
async def admin_route(user = Security(multi.require(role=Role.ADMIN))):
return user
"""
def __init__(self, *sources: AuthSource) -> None:
@@ -95,21 +61,7 @@ class MultiAuth:
return await self._call_fn(**kwargs)
def require(self, **kwargs: Any) -> "MultiAuth":
"""Return a new :class:`MultiAuth` with kwargs forwarded to each source.
Calls ``.require(**kwargs)`` on every source that supports it. Sources
that do not implement ``.require()`` (e.g. custom :class:`~AuthSource`
subclasses) are passed through unchanged.
New kwargs are merged over each source's existing kwargs — new values
win on conflict::
multi = MultiAuth(bearer, cookie)
@app.get("/admin")
async def admin(user = Security(multi.require(role=Role.ADMIN))):
return user
"""
"""Return a new :class:`MultiAuth` with kwargs forwarded to each source."""
new_sources = tuple(
cast(Any, source).require(**kwargs)
if hasattr(source, "require")
+160 -9
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ from fastapi_toolsets.security import (
oauth_decode_state,
oauth_encode_state,
oauth_fetch_userinfo,
oauth_generate_nonce,
oauth_resolve_provider_urls,
)
@@ -760,7 +761,10 @@ class TestCookieAuthSigned:
"""set_cookie signs the value; the signed cookie is verified on read."""
from fastapi import Response
auth = CookieAuth("session", cookie_validator, secret_key=self.SECRET)
# secure=False for test client which runs over plain HTTP
auth = CookieAuth(
"session", cookie_validator, secret_key=self.SECRET, secure=False
)
def setup(app: FastAPI):
@app.get("/login")
@@ -778,6 +782,26 @@ class TestCookieAuthSigned:
assert response.status_code == 200
assert response.json() == {"session": VALID_COOKIE}
def test_set_cookie_has_secure_flag_by_default(self):
"""set_cookie includes Secure flag when secure=True (the default)."""
from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
auth = CookieAuth("session", cookie_validator, secret_key=self.SECRET)
response = StarletteResponse()
auth.set_cookie(response, "value")
assert "secure" in response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
def test_set_cookie_no_secure_flag_when_disabled(self):
"""set_cookie omits Secure flag when secure=False (local dev)."""
from starlette.responses import Response as StarletteResponse
auth = CookieAuth(
"session", cookie_validator, secret_key=self.SECRET, secure=False
)
response = StarletteResponse()
auth.set_cookie(response, "value")
assert "secure" not in response.headers["set-cookie"].lower()
def test_tampered_signature_returns_401(self):
"""A cookie whose HMAC signature has been modified is rejected."""
import base64 as _b64
@@ -989,28 +1013,56 @@ def _make_async_client_mock(get_return=None, post_return=None):
class TestEncodeDecodeOAuthState:
def test_encode_returns_base64url_string(self):
result = oauth_encode_state("https://example.com/dashboard")
result = oauth_encode_state("https://example.com/dashboard", "test-nonce")
assert isinstance(result, str)
assert "+" not in result
assert "/" not in result
def test_round_trip(self):
url = "https://example.com/after-login?next=/home"
assert oauth_decode_state(oauth_encode_state(url), fallback="/") == url
nonce = "test-nonce"
assert (
oauth_decode_state(
oauth_encode_state(url, nonce), expected_nonce=nonce, fallback="/"
)
== url
)
def test_decode_none_returns_fallback(self):
assert oauth_decode_state(None, fallback="/home") == "/home"
assert (
oauth_decode_state(None, expected_nonce="any", fallback="/home") == "/home"
)
def test_decode_null_string_returns_fallback(self):
assert oauth_decode_state("null", fallback="/home") == "/home"
assert (
oauth_decode_state("null", expected_nonce="any", fallback="/home")
== "/home"
)
def test_decode_invalid_base64_returns_fallback(self):
assert oauth_decode_state("!!!notbase64!!!", fallback="/home") == "/home"
assert (
oauth_decode_state(
"!!!notbase64!!!", expected_nonce="any", fallback="/home"
)
== "/home"
)
def test_decode_handles_missing_padding(self):
url = "https://example.com/x"
encoded = oauth_encode_state(url).rstrip("=")
assert oauth_decode_state(encoded, fallback="/") == url
nonce = "test-nonce"
encoded = oauth_encode_state(url, nonce).rstrip("=")
assert oauth_decode_state(encoded, expected_nonce=nonce, fallback="/") == url
def test_decode_wrong_nonce_returns_fallback(self):
url = "https://example.com/dashboard"
encoded = oauth_encode_state(url, "correct-nonce")
assert (
oauth_decode_state(encoded, expected_nonce="wrong-nonce", fallback="/")
== "/"
)
def test_generate_nonce_is_random(self):
assert oauth_generate_nonce() != oauth_generate_nonce()
class TestBuildAuthorizationRedirect:
@@ -1023,16 +1075,19 @@ class TestBuildAuthorizationRedirect:
scopes="openid email",
redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/callback",
destination="https://app.example.com/dashboard",
nonce="test-nonce",
)
assert isinstance(response, RedirectResponse)
def test_redirect_location_contains_all_params(self):
nonce = "test-nonce"
response = oauth_build_authorization_redirect(
"https://auth.example.com/authorize",
client_id="my-client",
scopes="openid email",
redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/callback",
destination="https://app.example.com/dashboard",
nonce=nonce,
)
location = response.headers["location"]
parsed = urlparse(location)
@@ -1046,7 +1101,7 @@ class TestBuildAuthorizationRedirect:
assert params["scope"] == ["openid email"]
assert params["redirect_uri"] == ["https://app.example.com/callback"]
assert (
oauth_decode_state(params["state"][0], fallback="")
oauth_decode_state(params["state"][0], expected_nonce=nonce, fallback="")
== "https://app.example.com/dashboard"
)
@@ -1178,3 +1233,99 @@ class TestFetchUserinfo:
"https://auth.example.com/userinfo",
headers={"Authorization": "Bearer tok123"},
)
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_raises_on_unsupported_token_type(self):
token_resp = MagicMock()
token_resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock()
token_resp.json.return_value = {"access_token": "tok123", "token_type": "mac"}
cm, _ = _make_async_client_mock(post_return=token_resp, get_return=MagicMock())
with patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=cm):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported token_type"):
await oauth_fetch_userinfo(
token_url="https://auth.example.com/token",
userinfo_url="https://auth.example.com/userinfo",
code="authcode123",
client_id="client-id",
client_secret="client-secret",
redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/callback",
)
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_accepts_bearer_token_type_case_insensitive(self):
token_resp = MagicMock()
token_resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock()
token_resp.json.return_value = {
"access_token": "tok123",
"token_type": "Bearer",
}
userinfo_resp = MagicMock()
userinfo_resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock()
userinfo_resp.json.return_value = {"sub": "user-1"}
cm, _ = _make_async_client_mock(
post_return=token_resp, get_return=userinfo_resp
)
with patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=cm):
result = await oauth_fetch_userinfo(
token_url="https://auth.example.com/token",
userinfo_url="https://auth.example.com/userinfo",
code="authcode123",
client_id="client-id",
client_secret="client-secret",
redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/callback",
)
assert result == {"sub": "user-1"}
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_raises_when_required_scopes_not_granted(self):
token_resp = MagicMock()
token_resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock()
token_resp.json.return_value = {"access_token": "tok123", "scope": "openid"}
cm, _ = _make_async_client_mock(post_return=token_resp, get_return=MagicMock())
with patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=cm):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="required scopes"):
await oauth_fetch_userinfo(
token_url="https://auth.example.com/token",
userinfo_url="https://auth.example.com/userinfo",
code="authcode123",
client_id="client-id",
client_secret="client-secret",
redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/callback",
required_scopes="openid email profile",
)
@pytest.mark.anyio
async def test_passes_when_all_required_scopes_granted(self):
token_resp = MagicMock()
token_resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock()
token_resp.json.return_value = {
"access_token": "tok123",
"scope": "openid email profile",
}
userinfo_resp = MagicMock()
userinfo_resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock()
userinfo_resp.json.return_value = {"sub": "user-1", "email": "a@b.com"}
cm, _ = _make_async_client_mock(
post_return=token_resp, get_return=userinfo_resp
)
with patch("httpx.AsyncClient", return_value=cm):
result = await oauth_fetch_userinfo(
token_url="https://auth.example.com/token",
userinfo_url="https://auth.example.com/userinfo",
code="authcode123",
client_id="client-id",
client_secret="client-secret",
redirect_uri="https://app.example.com/callback",
required_scopes="openid email",
)
assert result["email"] == "a@b.com"